Relief for Mistake in Contracting by Newman, Ralph A.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 2 January 1969 Article 2
Relief for Mistake in Contracting
Ralph A. Newman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ralph A. Newman, Relief for Mistake in Contracting, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 232 (1969)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol54/iss2/2
RELIEF FOR MISTAKE IN CONTRACTING*
Ralph A. Newmanf
Whether the law should enforce a contract that was made by
mistake raises the question of the relative importance to be attached
to the actual intent of the parties and to the outward expression of
their intent. In Anglo-American common law the desirability of speed
and certainty in business transactions has overcome the importance
of giving effect to the will of the parties and has led to the objective
theory of contracts, which requires that the contract be enforced
against a party who was mistaken, even if the outward expression of
his intent was due to a serious mistake about a material fact.1 In
situations where one or both of the parties have entered into a contract
on the basis of a mistake, however, the objective test must often be
relaxed in the interest of justice. This article will attempt to describe
the current state of the law as it relates to the granting of relief for
mistake in contracting.
I
MISTAKE AS A GROUND FOR RESCISSION-
THE GENERAL GUIDELINES
Mutual mistake is a ground for rescission, according to section
502 of the Restatement of Contracts, if both parties were mistaken
about a matter that vitally affects the basis upon which they contracted.
According to section 503 of the Restatement, although the mistakes
need not be the same, they must, to make the contract voidable, relate
to the same matter.
0 A companion article on The Renaissance of Good Faith in Contracting will appear
in a later issue of this volume of the Cornell Law Review.
t Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of California. A.B. 1914,
LL.B. 1916, Harvard University.
1 "A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual,
intent of the parties." Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911)
(L. Hand, J.). "Assent, in the sense of the law, is a matter of overt acts, not of inward
unanimity in motives, design, or the interpretation of words." O'Donnell v. Clinton, 145
Mass. 461, 463, 14 N.E. 747, 751 (1888) (Holmes, J.). "[T]he fact that the manifestation was
made under a mistake ... will not prevent the formation of a contract." 1 S. WILLISON,
CoNTACrs § 20, at 30 (rev. ed. 1936) [hereinafter cited as WiLLsroN].
The theory has found a somewhat fortuitous anchorage in American law since its
foremost exponent, Williston, was the reporter for the Restatement of Contracts (1932)
in which the primacy of the objective test found expression.
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The problem of relief for unilateral mistake is dealt with some-
what obliquely in the Restatement of Contracts. Section 503 provides
that a mistake of only one party does not of itself render the transaction
voidable. Section 471(c) provides that fraud means non-disclosure
where it is not privileged. Section 472(b) provides that there is no
privilege of non-disclosure by a party who knows that the other party
is acting under a mistake as to an undisclosed material fact, and the
mistake, if mutual, would render voidable a transaction caused by
relying thereon. Section 502 provides that where the parties were both
mistaken regarding a fact assumed by them as the basis on which they
entered into the transaction, it is voidable by either party. The com-
bined effect of these provisions is that rescission for unilateral mistake
is available if the mistake was recognizable by the other party2 and
concerned a fact which was so vital that the mistake, had it been mu-
tual, would have made the contract voidable.3
II
DEFINING THE NATURE OF THE MISTAKE
First, the requirement that the mistake must relate to the same
fact, in relief for mutual mistake, is highly questionable. The principal
object in contracting is seldom the same on both sides. 4 The mistake
will almost always be harmful to only one of the parties,5 and, as
McClintock has pointed out, separate mistakes about the same fact
are hardly "mutual."" The tying of the right to rescind to a correspond-
ing right of the other party, who in fact opposes the rescission, is
reminiscent of the discredited doctrine of mutuality of remedy as a
condition to specific performance, and indicates a juristic craving
for a theoretical symmetry of remedy which is of doubtful value.
2 There is practically universal agreement that knowledge by the other party of the
mistake gives a right to rescind. 3 A. CoRmN, CoNTRAcTs § 610 (rev. ed. 1960) [hereinafter
cited as CORBIN].
8 RESTATEMENT OF CONRAars § 472, comment b (1932). Until recent times, a pre-
ponderating body of authority denied relief even if the unilateral mistake was basic and
recognizable, if it was due to negligence. 3 CORIN § 606. Since most mistakes are negligent
in some degree, this qualification precluded rescission in almost all cases of unilateral
mistake, although some courts allowed rescission even if negligence was present, usually
without stressing the point. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Lathrop, 94 Cal. 56, 29 P. 329 (1892)
(purchaser looked at the wrong lot).
4 Corbin, Frustration of Contract in the United States of America, 29 J. CoMP. Lo.
& INT'L LAW (3d ser.) 1, 4 (parts M-IV, 1947).
5 3 CoRm § 605, at 643.
6 McClintock, Mistake and the Contractual Interests, 28 MIm. L. Rav. 460, 471 (1944).
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Second, the tests for rescission for both mutual and unilateral
mistake-that the mistake must be vital and must constitute the basis
of contracting--conceal an imprecision of definition behind a verbal
facade of simplicity.
There is great difficulty in defining exactly what constitutes a
matter that vitally affects the basis on which both parties entered into
the transaction. It is often said that relief will be given only for
mistakes as to the intrinsic nature of the bargain, and not for mistakes
in collateral matters. The most meaningful way to express this dis-
tinction seems to be whether the mistake affects the intrinsic value of
the contract or whether it makes the contract more valuable or less
valuable to one of the parties. Williston is critical of the distinction,7
but the test of the Restatement of Contracts, that the mistake must
be about an essential fact that was the basis on which each party con-
tracted, seems to exclude mistakes in collateral motive of one of the
parties. This construction seems to be corroborated by the provisions
of the Restatement of Contracts8 and of the Restatement of Restitution,9
which make the determination of excusable mistake turn on the ques-
tion of whether or not the mistake affects the benefit or burden of the
expected exchanges. Williston feels that the contract is not voidable
where the transaction is the kind of transaction the parties had in
mind, and that mistakes as to other facts are unimportant; 10 and
it is this approach that has been incorporated into the Restatement
definition. The Restatements have abandoned the Roman law test
which limited relief to mistakes affecting the identity or quality of
the subject matter," a test that has long since ceased to be appropriate
to the modem economy in which transactions are not confined to ex-
changes or sales of specific property but include more complicated
transactions involving services. The Restatement of Contracts has
enlarged this test to include mistakes that affect the nature of the
transaction; but in confining excusable mistake to mistakes of that
nature, the Restatement preserves the distinction between intrinsic
7 5 W=TSvoN § 1544, at 4334.
.RATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 502 (1932): '[A transaction] is voidable by either
party if enforcement of it would be materially more onerous to him than it would have
been had the fact been as the parties believed it to be .... ,?
9 R STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 16, comment c (1937): "IMhe transaction can be
rescinded by, and only by, the one who has given or promised to give more or who has
received or has been promised less than he expected."
10 5 WLISTON § 1569.




and collateral mistake. This distinction loses much of its significance
because both mistakes can be equally injurious, depending on the
circumstances. There are many cases in which rescission has been
granted for intrinsic mistake in matters upon which only one of the
parties has relied,12 and rescission has often been denied for collateral
mistake, no matter how decisively it may have motivated the mistaken
party to enter into the contract.13 "That [the mistake] was material in
the sense that but for it plaintiff would not have considered for a
moment the making of the contract., . clearly is not enough." 4 On
the other hand there are many cases that have refused rescission for
intrinsic mistake,15 and rescission for collateral mistake has often been
granted. 6 The difficulty of defining excusable mistake is not lessened
12 E.g., Fleischer v. McGehee, 111 Ark. 626, 163 S.W. 169 (1914) (mistake as to the
absence of standing timber on tract purchased by mistake for another tract); Goodrich
v. Lathrop, 94 Cal. 56, 29 P. 329 (1892) (purchase of wrong tract); Burkett v. J.A. Thomp-
son S. Son, 150 Cal. App. 2d 523, $10 P.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1957) (failure to reveal that land
was filled); Clauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal, App. 2d 453, 112 P.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1941) (failure to
reveal that land sold had been filled); Schaefer v. Henze, 337 IM. 41, 168 N.E. 625 (1929)
(part of house and land of vendor included by mistake of surveyor); Jermor Homes, Inc.
v. Hoehlein, 133 N.Y.S..d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (vendor contracted to sell a house and lot
upon which he had built a house plus garage by mistake); Brown v. Bradley, 259 S.W.
676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (deed included by mistake property the vendor did not own).
13 Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55 (1876) (purchase of land for mining gold, in belief
that an abandoned shaft was on the property; it w p actually on another part of the
vendor's land) (dicta); Carignan v. Amosikeag Hamper Co., 95 N.H, 26g, 61 A,,d 799 (1948)
(release given under mistake as to its effect on rights under Workmen's Compensation Act);
Robert G. Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 91 N.H. 459, 21 A.2d 591 (1941) (solid rock in place
to be excavated); Guaranty Safe Dep. & Trust Co. v. Liebold, 207 Pa, 339, 56 A. 951 (1904)
(f4ilure to disclose prospective establishment of a manufacturing plant near property to
be sold); Kowalke v. Milwaukee Elec, R y. & Light Co., 103 Wis. 472, 79 N.W. 762 (1899)
(woman settled claim for personal injuries in ignorance of fact that she was pregnant at
time of the accident).
14 Hannah v. Steinman, 159 Cal. 142, 147, 112 P. 1094, 1096 (1911) (dictum).
15 Olson V. Shepard, 165 Minn. 433, 206 N.W. 711 (1926) (mistake in boundaries);
Smith v. Beatty, 37 N.C. 456 (1843) (defendant leased from plaintiff knowing a gold mine
existed); Harris v. Tyson, 24 Pa. 347 (1855) (deposits of sand chrome on land to be sold).
$ee 5 WILLISTON § 1426, at 3995; cf. Bean Y. Valle, 9 Mo. 126 (1829); Cavanagh v. Tyson,
Weare & Marshall Co., 227 Mass. 437, 116 N.E. 818 (1917) (unexpected stone fill where
piles were to be installed); Cotter v. Lukie, [1918] N.Z.L.R. 811, [1918] Gaz. L.R. 583
(sale of Polled Angus bull), criticized in 5 WMLWuroN § 1569 n.1.
16 Moffett, Hodgkins & Clarke Co. v. Rochester, 178 U.S. 373 (1900) (mistakes in bid
for public work); McCarty v. Anderson, 58 So. Rd 955 (La. Ct. App. 1952) (strip of dry land
excluded by vendor, without purchaser's knowledge, from land sold, which was, in general,
swampy); Kutsche Y. Ford, 292 Mich. 442, 199 NW. 714 (1923) (mistake in bid for public
work); Richardson Lumber Co. v. Hoey, 219 Mich. 643, 189 N.W. 923 (1922) (underground
fires were burning close to railroad ties sold; treated by the court as mistake as to the
safety of the ties); St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, 135 Minn. 115, 160 N.W. 500 (1916)
(mistake in bid for private construction); O'Shea v. Morris, 112 Neb, 102, 198 N.W. 866
(1924) (vendor failed to inform purchaser that a driveway was not wholly on property
1969]
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by the distinction drawn in the Restatement of Contracts and the
Restatement of Restitution between mutual and unilateral mistakes,
and it is perhaps for this reason that Corbin in his discussion of the
effect of mistake treats -these two types together.17 The difficulty of
defining the kind of mistake that entitles a mistaken party to rescission
is well illustrated by the inconsistencies in Williston's explanations
of the provisions of the Restatement of Contracts and in definitions
offered by Williston himself. In section 1570 of the revised edition of
his treatise, published in 1937, Williston states that mistake justifies
rescission where the subject matter is better in an essential respect, or
essentially worse, than was supposed. In section 1569 he offers the test
that the mistake must make the contract something quite different
from what the parties had supposed it to be. Again, he states in section
1544 that where the transaction is the kind of transaction the parties
had in mind, mistakes as to other facts are unimportant. His example
in section 1570 of an excusable mistake-failure to note an ordinance
forbidding the erection of a wooden building, the purpose for which
the purchaser bought the property--certainly broadens the latter test.
It is difficult to reconcile Williston's statement that the Restatement
of Contracts permits relief for mistake in any fact if the parties assumed
its truth as a basis for their bargain,1 8 with his test, that the mistake
justifies relief only where the subject matter is better, or worse, in an
essential respect, than was supposed.' 9 In the Restatement of Contracts,
the statement appears that where both parties erroneously assume the
existence of a certain state of facts, the injured party can avoid the
transaction, and that it is immaterial whether the mistake affects iden-
tity, or attributes, or "other facts."20 This would allow relief for an
error in any "decisive fact," a rule which Williston expressly rejects
as too broad in section 1544 of his treatise.21
The inconsistency of the decisions as to the effect of mistake in
contracting is due to the fact that Anglo-American law is torn between
the desire for stability of commercial 'transactions and the feeling that
it is unfair to hold a party to a contract that he made without complete
sold); In re Clark, 233 App. Div. 487, 253 N.Y.S. 524 (4th Dep't 1931) (settlement of claims
to an estate based on error as to amount one of the parties was entitled to receive under
a will); Brown v. Lamphear, 35 Vt. 252 (1862) (land sold contained a spring by mistake
of the vendor, who needed the spring for his retained land); Donaldson v. Abraham, 68
Wash. 208, 122 P. 1003 (1912) (mistake in addition in bid for public work).
17 3 CoIN § 608, at 674.
18 5 WLLUSrON § 1570A, at 4391.
19 Id. § 1570, at 4383-84.
20 R.SrATE MENT OF CONTaCTS § 502, comment a (1932).
21 5 WILLsroN § 1544, at 434.
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information about all the relevant circumstances. The latter consid-
eration rests on a sense of fair play which looks with disfavor on per-
mitting anyone to reap an advantage from another party's mistakes.
Thurman Arnold has referred to "the harsh ethics of traders . . .
[which] necessarily justify over-reaching one's opponent and trampling
on weaker and less skillful individuals."'22 He adds, "There is need
for an area, incapable of logical definition though it may be, where a
different set of ethics prevail ....-" 23 The ambivalent approach to the
problem of excusable mistake, arising out of these conflicting stresses,
has introduced into the problem an almost insoluble confusion. Thayer
has said that it is almost impossible to define the kind of mistake that
entitles a party to rescind.24 Although the tendency is to limit rescission
to mistakes that turn the transaction into one of a different kind than
was intended, this distinction is difficult to apply;25 and there are
many decisions that have allowed rescission for mistakes that do not
bear any relationship to basic assumptions.2 It may be stated with
assurance that our legal system has no firm test, even in the most gen-
eral terms, for telling in what cases it is proper, and in what cases
improper, to allow rescission for either mutual or unilateral mistake.
But it is indisputable that relief is much more freely granted for mutual
mistake than where the mistake is unilateral, although this distinction
has never been completely justified,27 and that relief is granted more
liberally in equity than at law.
III
MISTAKE AS GROUND FOR DENIAL
OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
In judicial doctrine a sharp distinction is drawn between the
effect to be given unilateral mistake in suits for specific performance
and in actions for damages. The denial of specific performance in
cases of unilateral mistake rests on the equitable approach to con-
tractual responsibility, according to which there is no valid consent
22 Arnold, Book Review, 36 CoLUM. L. REv. 687, 690 (1936).
23 Id.
24 Thayer, Unilateral Mistake and Unjust Enrichment as a Ground for Avoidance
of Legal Transactions, in HARvAim LEGAL ESSAYS 467 (1934).
25 See Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; or Hard Cases Can Make Good
Law, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 223, 229 (1962): "Unquestionably the vagaries of the influence of
error discourage courts from inquiring into it as searchingly as they might."
26 See cases cited note 16 supra.
27 See Thayer, supra note 24, at 473: "Inhere is no justification for any categorical
distinction between unilateral and bilateral mistakes ...."
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
if the consent was given by mistake. Relief for unilateral mistake is
provided in suits for specific pefformance by denying specific perfor-
mance againgt the mistaken party, even though the mistake Was not
basic, and even if it Was not apparent to one party. Specific performance
has been refused for intrlsic mistake, 28 and even for collateral mis-
takes.29 Many cases, supported by authority of long tradition, have
refused to grant specific performance but have also refused to rescind
the contract, thus leaving open to the plaintiff the possibility of re-
covering damages. But the denial of specific performance is often an
inadequate solution, since in many cases the remedy in damages left
open to the plaintiff would operate against the mistaken party just
as severely as would the enforcement of his obligation by a decree for
specific performancee.8 0 The availability of the remedy in damages may
thus destroy the effectiveness of the equitable defense.8 1
28 Mansfield v. Sherman, 81 Me. 365, 17 A. 800 (1889) (valuable building site included
by mistake); Bean v. Valle, 2 Mo. 126 (1829) (putcha er concealed hi4 knowledge of A
mine on the property); Malim V. Freeman, 2 Keen 25, 48 Ehg. Rep. 537 (Rolls Ct. 1857)
(wrong plot bid in at auction); Wallace v, McGirr, [1936] N.Z.LR. 483, E19 36] Gaz. L.R. 388
(purchase of wrong plot); cf. Mansell v. Lord Lumber & Fuel Co., 348 Ill. 140, 180 N.E. 774
(1932) (vendor by mistake, with purchasef's knowledge, failed to provide that deed Wds
to be subject to Unpaid assessments); Chute v. Quincy, 156 Mag§, 189, 30 N.E. 550 (1892);
Twining v. Neili 38 N.J. Eq. 470 (Ch. 1884) (purchaser learned of encumbrance after
sale); Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns, Ch. 585 (N.Y, 1817) (mistake in quantity of land sold);
Smith v. 1eatty, 87 N.C. 456 (1849).
29 Byers v. Stubbs, 85 Ala. 256, 4 So. 755 (1888) (failure tO reveal great demand for
land in the vicinity); Mansell v. Lord Lumber & Fuel Co., 348 Ill. 140, 180 N.E. 774 (1932)
(vendor by mistake, with purchaser's knowledge, omitted from contract a provision that
deed was subject to unpaid assessments); Hetfield v. Willey, 105 Ill. 286 (1888) (failure
to reveal debts of firm to be sold); Dunlop v. Wever, 209 Iowa 590, 228 N.W. 562 (1930)
(great difference in value); Burkhdltef V. Jones, 32 Kan, 5, 8 P. 559 (1884) (mistake in
amount of purchase price); Baker v. Polydisky, 144 Minn. 72, 174 N.W. 526 (1919) (mistake
in option price); Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 172 N.W. 907 (1919) (mistake in book
value of stock, seriously impairing value of capital); Panco v. Rogers, 19 N.J. Super. 12,
87 A.2d 770 (Ch. 1952) (mistake ii purchase priem); Twining v. Neil, 98 NJ. Eq. 470
(Ch. 1884) (mistake as to existefcet of a prior lien on the property bid in at auction);
Kleinberg v, Ratett, 252 N.Y. 236, 169 N.E. 289 (1929) (failure to reveal presence of under-
ground stream); Bray v. Briggs, 28 L.T.1L (n.s.) 817 (Rolls Ct. 1872) (mistake concerning
use to which purchased pr~petty could be putt); Day v. Newman, 2 Cox. Ch. 77, 30 Eng.
Rep. 36 (Ch. 1788); Sneesby V. Thorme, 7 DeG. M.9cG, 399, 44 Erig, Rep. 156 (Ch, 1855).
In Standard Steel Car Co. v. Stamm, 207 Pa. 419, 56 A. 954 (1904), specific performance
was granted against the mistaken party, who did not knoW of contemplated improvements
in the vicinity; see J. POMEROY & J. MANN, sPEcIrC PERFORMANCE § 245 n.(1)(a), at 592
(8d ed. 1926).
80 See Willard v. Tayloe, 7b U.S. (8 Wail.) 557 (186); Marks V. Gates, 154 F. 481 (9th
Cir. 1907); Johnson Realty 9 Ikv. CO. V. Gro~venft, 241 Mich. 821, 217 N.W. 20 (1928);
Z. CAFE, SoME PR60aLEMS Ot Eqtlti 26 (1950); 3 T. SmoiWic, DAMAGES g 1012 (9th rev.
ed. 1912); Gafvey, Some Apeets of the Merger of Lato and Equity, 10 CAmT. U.L. RV.
(1961).





A. Denying Specific Performance and Granting Damages
Many cases in which specific performance has been dehied seem,
as a matter of elemental justice, to require rescission of the contract.
An illiterate carpenter, seventy-seven years old and hard of hearing,
thought that an offer for his land was for $12,500, instead of the actulal
amount of the offer, $5,500. The court found that the land was worth
$10,000, Although specific performance was refused, the court also re-
fused to allow rescission, on the ground that the purchaser was guilt-
less of any wrongdoing,3 2 In another case a widow, owning a life
to Sue for damages after the right of specific performance has been denied. Many prob-
lems of specific enforcement arise out of transactions concerning real property, generally
at the suit of the purchaser. In actions for damages for breach of contract to buy or sell
land, the damages in most jurisdictions are the difference between the purchase price and
the value of the land. See 82 MIcH. L. REv. 518 (1933). Except in eatching baxgains this
difference Would be negligible as well as difficult to prove; and if the disparity is great,
the inadequacy of the consideration, especially if coupled with even slight proof of un-
fairness, might lead to a conclusive presumption of fraud even in the prosecution of the
claim for damaged, and so defeat d recovery. See Miller v. Coffeen, 265 Mo. 204, 280 S.W.2d
100 (1955). Extreme inadeqUacy of c6nsiderationi is ground for denial of specific per-
formance. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 485, 201 A.2d 886
(1964); see McClintock, supra note 6. Inadequacy may be such as "shocks the conscience,
and amounts in itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of fraud in the transaction .... "
Coles v. Tredothick, 9 Ves. Jr. 238, 46, 32 Eng. Rep. 59, 597 (Ch. 1804) (Lord Eldon).
Inadequacy of consideration has been made by statute a defense in suits for specific peta
formance in several states. Examples are: CAL. CIV. CODE § 8391 (West 1954); GA. CODE
ANN. § 37-805 (1935); MONT. REv. CODnES ANN. § 17-808 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 82-04-13
(1960); S.D. CODE § 97A609 (Supp. 1960). The preViintg rule is tontra; see Annot., 65
A.L.R. 7, 86 (1980). If the subsequent proceedings are before a jury, it is doubtful that
they will be impressed with the merits of the claimant's case, and jurors have a notorious
fondness for disregarding the court's instructions. "[J]tiries pay scant attention to the type
of instructions commonly given them on the law npplicable to the facts . . . 2' Firley,
Instructions to juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE LJ. 194, 218 (1982).
"It is inconceivable that any judge or jury woUld award damages to this buyer in an
'action at law'; and the bringing of stuch a suit should have been prevented by a decree
of rescission." 3 CoRBiN § 608 i.39, cofnienting oti Panco v. Rogers, 19 N.J. Super. 12,
87 A.2d 770 (Ch. 1952). "[l]t is believed that, in this class of ca es, the number of instances
where the plaintiff would recover damages, When equity had refused him specific per-
formance, would be surprisingly small." 80 YALE L.J. b06, 509 n.11 (1920), referring to offer
made by mistake in addition in Webster v. Cecil, 80 Beav. 62, 54 Efig. Rep. 812 (Rolls Ct.
1861), where specific petformince Was fefused for unilateral mistake, and the plaintiff was
remitted to his action at law. Even if the subseqiuent pr6ceedings are before a judge, he
may have the same reaction; especially if he is the same judge who dishiissed the claim
for specific performance.
32 Panco v. Rogers, 19 N.J. Sup&r. 12, 87 A 2d 170 (Ch. 1952).
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interest in property which she had occupied as her home for mote than
thirty years, yielded to threats and misrepresentations of her son, who
owned the remainder interest and was anxious to sell, and who told her
that her life interest would be forfeited unless she joined in the contract
of sale. The purchaser had no knowledge of the threats or misrepresen-
tations. The circumstances fully justified the court's denial of specific
performance, but its refusal to allow rescission is questionable. 3 In
another case the vendor, as the result of a mistake made by his own
surveyor in laying out a tract of land, did not know that it included
a fine building site worth five times the average price for the plots that
were intended to be included in the tract to be sold. The court
refused to grant specific performance against the vendor, stating that
damages would be an adequate remedy.3 4 The rationale in all such
cases is entirely inconsistent with the theory on which equity grants
specific performance of contracts for the sale of real property-that dam-
ages are not an adequate remedy. Damages cannot be an inadequate
remedy if the vendor knew what he was about, but adequate if he made
a mistake. In both cases damages are inadequate from the point of view
of the buyer. In case of defective eyesight,35 defective hearing,3 6 for-
gotten eyeglasses,3 and mental distress causing mistake,38 relief against
the mistaken party has frequently been denied in equity although
allowed at law. Occasionally rescission is allowed where the mistake
was caused by failure to read the contract.39 There are many cases
involving the purchase of the wrong tract of land in which specific
performance is denied, but the vendor is left to his remedy in damages. 40
When the contract calls for a sale by boundaries and not by the acre,
relief is denied even at law when the shortage in estimated acreage is
substantial. 41 Specific performance is granted with compensation in
situations where the sale is at a stated rate per acre,4 unless the dis-
crepancy is so great that the purpose of the contract would be defeated
were such a remedy to be given.43
33 Mainelli v. Neuhaus, 157 Neb. 392, 59 N.W.2d 607 (1953).
34 Mansfield v. Sherman, 81 Me. 365, 17 A. 300 (1889).
36 Shulter's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 90, 77 Eng. Rep. 1366 (K.B. 1611).
36 Panco v. Rogers, 19 N.J. Super. 12, 87 A.2d 770 (Ch. 1952).
37 Young v. Springer, 113 Minn. 382, 129 N.W. 773 (1911).
33 Grant Marble Co. v. Abbot, 142 Wis. 279, 124 N.W. 264 (1910).
39 McMahon v. Tanner, 122 Utah 333, 249 P.2d 502 (1952).
40 E.g., Malins v. Freeman, 2 Keen 25, 48 Eng. Rep. 537 (Rolls Ct. 1837); Wallace v.
McGirr, [1936] N.Z.L.R. 483, [1936] Gaz. L.R. 388.
41 Sanders v. Lindsey, 204 Ky. 57, 263 S.W. 718 (1924).
42 McCombs v. Church, 180 Cal. 233, 180 P. 535 (1919).
43 McGeorge v. White, 295 Ky. 367, 174 S.W.2d 532 (1943).
[-Vol. 54:232
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B. Cases Generally Denying or Granting Relief
It is also difficult to reconcile decisions in which relief of any kind,
either specific performance or damages, is denied and decisions in
which an agreement incorporating a mistake is enforced. A defendant
was held liable for the purchase price of needles, although he had by
mistake ordered twenty-five hundred papers of needles instead of
twenty-five hundred needles, as he had intended,44 and an agreement
to trade ten shares of stock, under the impression that the par value
was one hundred dollars when it was really two hundred dollars, was
enforced.45 By contrast, an uneducated man without practical experi-
ence bought up a ground rent on his property in the expectation of
having it replaced for his own benefit when he sold the property. He
signed a contract without such a provision, on the assurance of his
own broker that such a provision would be added. The court denied
the purchaser any relief, either in specific performance or damages,
saying that "all the plaintiff would lose was a windfall." 46 Until fairly
recent times, cases were extremely rare which openly accepted at law
the defense of unilateral mistake where the mistake was not apparent
to the other party. For many years, however, there have been decisions
in which the doctrine of relief has been received into the law by in-
direction. A mutual friend of the vendor and purchaser pointed out
to the purchaser a lot on the other side of the street from the lot the
vendor intended to sell, and which was described in the contract. The
court found that the minds of the parties had not met.47 In another
case where the court found that the contract was too indefinite to be
enforced specifically, the real reason for the dismissal of the complaint
is seen in the court's statement that "the effects of a pure mistake
upon the rights of the suffering party are the same as injuries and call
as loudly for relief as those of fraud."48
V
DEVELOPMENT IN THE LAW REGARDING RELIEF FOR MISTAKE
It seems that a development is taking place, or may already have
occurred, in the treatment of unilateral mistake, similar to that which
44 J. A. Coates 9: Sons v. Buck, 93 Wis. 128, 67 N.W. 23 (1896).
45 Wilson v. Wyoming Cattle & Inv. Co., 129 Iowa 16, 105 N.W. 338 (1905).
46 Kappelman v. Bowie, 201 Md. 86, 93 A.2d 266 (1952).
47 Stong v. Lane, 66 Minn. 94, 68 N.W. 765 (1896).
48 Pope v. Speiser, 7 IMI. 2d 231, 241, 130 N.E2d 507, 512 (1955), quoting 2 J. PoMERoy,
Equrry JuRIsPRuDENcE, § 867, at 1782 n. (4th ed. 1918).
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
has occurred in the treatment of the effect of unconscionable conduct
on the part of the plaintiff. Judicial statements continue, in cases in
which specific performance is denied, to the effect that unilateral
mistake is not a defense to actions for damages,49 and there are still
instances in which rescission for collateral mistake,50 or even intrinsic
mistake,51 is denied. But when the mistake goes to an essential feature
of the contract, was not due to gross negligence, and it is possible to
place the other party in status quo,52 rescission, especially in recent
49 Cases holding that unilateral mistake is not a defense in actions for damages:
Jansen v. United States, 344 F.2d 363 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (extrinsic mistake in interpretation of
contract); Noland Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 801 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1962) (mistake as
to size and site of tank to be built by plaintiff, applying South Carolina law); United
States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (mistake in bid commurd-
cated after acceptance, applying federal substantive law); Sidor v. Kravec, 135 Conn. 571,
66 A.2d 812 (1949) (specific performance denied, damages also denied because no finding
or request to find that the market value exceeded the contract price; dicta as to right to
damages); Burkhalter v. Jones, 32 Kan. 5, 3 P1 559 (1884) (plaintiff misread purchase price);
Cox-Hardie Co. v. Rabalais, 162 So. 2d 713 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (mistake in bid); Piliawsky
v. Colar, 112 So. 2d 730 (La. Ct. App. 1959) (extrinsic mistake as to connectibility of
plumbing; mistake by owner); Dunham v. Hogan, 143 Me. 142, 56 A.2d 550 (1948) (mistake
concerning sale of land and assignment of a contract for the sale of gravel; intrinsic
mistake); Mansfield v. Sherman, 81 Me. 365, 17 A. 300 (1889) (valuable building site
included by mistake); Perlmutter v. Bacas, 219 Md. 406, 149 A.2d 23 (1959) (specific per-
formance denied, mistake by purhaser who thought that property had access to road, and
intended to subdivide property; intrinsic mistake). Cf. Pond v. Fisher, 201 Va. 542, 112
S.E.2d 147 (1960) (purchaser mistaken in supposing property adjoined street; specific per-
formance granted); Hayford v. Century Ins. Co, 106 N.H. 242, 209 A.2d 716 (1965) (intrinsic
mistake concerning coverage of fire insurance policy); Sullivan v. Jennings, 44 N.J. Eq. 11,
14 A. 104 (Ch. 1888) (bid at foreclosure under mistake as to amount of cash necessary; bid
included amount due on second mortgage; specific performance denied); Johns-Manviile
Sales Corp. v. Stone, 5 App. Div. 2d 110, 169 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Ist Dep't 1957) (mistake in
interpretation of contract, no unjust enrichment shown); Herman v. Stern, 419 Pa. 272,
213 A.2d 594 (1965) (provision concerning commissions inserted by mistake).
Specific performance denied, and plaintiff left to his remedy at law in the following
cases: C. H. Young Co. v. Springer, 113 Minn. 382, 129 N.W. 773 (1911) (forgotten eye-
glasses); Panco v. Rogers, 19 N.J. Super. 12, 87 A.2d 770 (Ch. 1952) (defective hearing caused
mistake in purchase price); Grant Marble Co. v. Abbot, 142 Wis. 279, 124 N.W. 264 (1910)
(mental distress); Webster v. Cecil, 30 Beav. 62, 54 Eng. Rep. 812 (Rolls Ct. 1861) (specific
performance denied for mistake in addition); Willan v. Willan, 16 Ves. Jr. 72, 33 Eng. Rep.
911 (Ch. 1810) (specific performance denied); Malins v. Freeman, 2 Keen 25, 48 Eng. Rep.
537 (Rolls Ct. 1837) (plaintiff bought wrong tract); Shulter's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 90, 77 Eng.
Rep. 1366 (K.B. 1611) (mistake in nature of the transaction); Wallace v. McGirr, E1936]
N.Z.L.R. 483, [1930] Gaz. L.R. 388 (plaintiff bought wrong lot).
50 E.g., Carignan v. Amoskeag Hamper Co., 95 N.H. 262, 61 A.2d 799 (1948) (settlement
under mistake as to effect on rights of injured person under Workmen's Compensation
Act); Wilson v. Wyoming Cattle & Inv. Co., 129 Iowa 16, 105 N.W. 338 (1905).
51 E.g., Cavanagh v. Tyson, Weare & Marshall Co., 227 Mass. 437, 116 N.E. 818 (1917)
(stony fill where piles were to be installed); Robert G, Watklins & Son v. Carrig, 91 N.H.
459, 21 A.2d 591 (1941) (solid rock in place to be excavated),
52 [Equitabi :rqh' by way of rescission may be given if the mistake relates to a
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years, has usually been allowed.5 3 The cases do not draw, for the most
part, a distinction between an intrinsic mistake, affecting the subject
matter, and a collateral mistake. In many opinions in which the dis-
tinction is repeated it seems to be for the purpose of supporting a
determination already arrived at by the court on other grounds. In
cases involving bids for public work, authority to the effect that a
serious mistake in the bid will justify rescission of the bid even after,
as well as before, it has been accepted, is almost unanimous, although
sometimes based on forced reasoning such as that the mistake was
apparent,5 4 or that the bid may be withdrawn, although the statute
material feature of the contract, if it is of such graVe consequence that enforce-
ment of the contract as made will be unconscionable, if it occurred notwithstand-
ing the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party making the mistake, and if
the other party can be put in statu quo.
3 J. PoMERoy, Equrry JuRisPRuDENcE § 870(a) (5th ed. 1941) (footnote omitted).
53 Rescission granted:
Bids-notification of mistake before acceptance of bid; M. F. Kemper Constr. Co. V.
Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 235 P.2d 7 (1951) (item omitted from bid); People v. Joha W.
Rouse Constr. Corp,, 26 App. Div. 2d 405, 274 N.Y.S.2d 981 (3d Dep't 1906) (dicta); State v.
Union Constr. Co., 9 Utah 2d 107, 339 P2d 421 (1959).
Bids-notification of mistake after acceptance of bid: School Comm'rs v. Bender, 96
Ind. App. 164, 72 N.E. 154 (1904) (item omitted; court found no meeting of the minds),
Murray State Normal School v. Cole, 209 Ky. 761, 273 S.W. 508 (1925) (item omitted);
Kutsche v. Ford, 222 Mich. 442, 192 N.W. 714 (1923) (item omitted); St. Nicholas Church
v. Kropp, 185 Minn. 115, 160 N.W. 500 (1916) (bid for private construction); School Dist.
v. Olson Constr. Co., 153 Neb. 451, 45 N.W.2d 164 (1950); Barlow v. Jones, 87 A. 649 (NJ.
Ch. 1913) (item omitted); Abner M. Harper, Inc. v. City of Newburgh, 159 App. Div. 695,
145 N.Y.S. 59 (2d Dep't 1913) (two items transposed); Donaldson v. Abraham, 68 Wash. 208,
122 P. 1003 (1912) (mistake in addition); Board of Educ. v. Hooper, 350 S.W.2d 629 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1961) (action at law on bid bond; judgment for defendant, who had omitted an
item from his bid); Kenneth E. Clirran, Inc. v. State, 106 N.H. 558, 215 A.2d 702 (1965)
(adding machine failed to record an item $100,000 above its capacity).
Cases not involving bids, and in which there was no knowledge of the mistake:
Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946) (mistake in a release as to land
included in deed); McCarty v. Anderson, 58 So. 2d 255 (La. Ct. App. 1952) (mistake as to
land included in deed); Kappelman v. Bowie, 201 Md. 86, 93 A.2d 266 (1952) (wrong plot
purchased); Stong v. Lane, 66 Minn. 94, 68 N.W. 765 (1896) (wrong plot purchased);
Rosenblum V. Manufacturers Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 79, 200 N.E. 587 (1936) (mistake in insur-
ance policy coverage, the policy having expired); Colvin v. Baskett, 407 S.W.2d 19 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966) (plaintiff sold three bags of coins, one bag belonging to someone else,
rescission granted on ground of no meeting of the minds); Brown v. Bradley, 259 S.W. 676
(rex. Civ. App. 1924) (deed cancelled because it included land vendor did not own).
Rescission was denied in: United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226 III. 9, 80 NE. 564 (1907); Daddario V.
Town of Milford, 296 Mass. 92, 5 N.E.2d 23 (1936).
54 R. 0. Bromagin & Co. v. City of Bloomington, 234 Ill. 114, 84 N.E. 700 (1908); City
of Baltimore v. DeLuca'Davis Constr. Co., 210 Md. 518, 124 A.2d 557 (1956); School Dist. v.
Olson Constr. Co., 153 Neb. 451, 45 N.W.2d 164 (1950); Rushlight Automatic Sprinkler Co.
v. City of Portland, 189 Ore. 194, 219 P.2d 732 (1950).
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says that it is irrevocable, because it does not represent the true intent
of the bidder.55 An option given for consideration is not only an offer
but is also a unilateral contract to keep the offer open,"6 and bids
pursuant to statutes that provide that the bids are irrevocable are
equally binding. The cases that allow rescission where notice of the
mistake has been received before the bid was accepted are equally
as authoritative, therefore, as cases in which notice of the mistake
was not received until after the acceptance of the bid. In two cases in
the Court of Claims, 57 a bid for construction work, based on a mis-
take in each case, was revoked after the acceptance of the bid had been
mailed, but before it was delivered to the bidder. The decisions, which
granted rescission, were based on the fact that no contract was con-
cluded until the acceptance had reached the offeror. A sounder ground,
suggested by Corbin, is that the enforcement of the bid would have
been utterly inequitable regardless of whether or not the acceptance be-
came effective on mailing.r8 No one would maintain that the moral values
involved would be any different if the mistake had not been discovered
until the following day, after the letter of acceptance had been re-
ceived. There have been in recent years many cases, other than those
involving bids, in which rescission has been granted for unilateral
mistakes.' 9 In the last ten years three different jurisdictions have gran-
ted rescission for unilateral mistake,60 and there has been no case
denying rescission. It may be that all that is necessary for the coales-
cence of the standards of equity and common law in this area of con-
tracts is for the courts to make explicit a change that has already
taken place.
There is strong justification for providing relief for mistake in
a more meaningful fashion than by merely denying specific enforce-
ment. The difference between the moral position of a person who has
been guilty of sharp practice in the inducement of a contract and of
one who seeks to enforce a contract made by a mistake of which the
other party was unaware and for which he was not responsible, is hardly
55 City of Baltimore v. DeLuca-Davis Constr. Co., 210 Md. 518, 124 A.2d 557 (1956).
Relief generally has been allowed only for clerical errors, as distinguished from errors of
judgment. 5 WEIMSTON § 1578.
56 5 WuLasrozi § 1441.
57 Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 417 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Dick v.
United States, 82 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
58 3 Co iiN § 609, at 683 n.47.
59 See cases cited note 53 supra.
60 Board of Educ. v. Hooper, 350 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961); McClure v. Rigna-
nese, 25 App. Div. 2d 565, 267 N.Y.S.2d 910 (2d Dep't 1966); Colvin v. Baskett, 407 S.W.2d
19 (rex. Civ. App. 1966).
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so great as to justify a difference in result. The distinction between
cheating a person and letting him cheat himself is tenuous. Corbin
has said that "a just and reasonable man will not insist on profiting
by the other's mistake." 61 Lord Denning has expressed the opinion that
that "[filf good faith is required in a person who gives a promise, so
it should be in a person who takes the benefit of it. He should not
enforce it in circumstances which it was never intended to cover." 62
Although Lord Denning's remark was made with reference to relief
for frustration due to subsequent unforeseeable events, it would not
seem to make a significant difference whether the frustration results
from future happenings or occurs immediately upon the making of
the contract. In frustration cases the disappointment of the expecta-
tions of one of the parties occurs later, making it more likely that a
detrimental change of position has taken place than in the case of
mistakes, which are usually discovered promptly. If no detriment
occurs that cannot be adequately compensated in damages, there seems
to be little significant difference between the two situations. The
choice seems to lie between a rule based on circumstances that ordi-
narily occur, and a rule to be flexibly applied on the basis of the facts
of the particular case with regard to detrimental change in position.
Throughout most of legal history the common law choice would have
inclined in favor of certainty, the equitable choice in favor of flex-
ibility. It would seem that the equitable approach would be more
closely in harmony with modem attitudes toward the objectives of law.
CONCLUSION
Exceptions to the rule denying rescission for unilateral mistake
have already gained a firm foothold in the areas of insurance con-
tracts,68 releases of claims for personal injuries,64 compromise settle-
ments,65 admiralty claims for salvage, 66 bids for construction work,67
and cancellation or reformation of irrevocable inter vivos trusts.68
61 3 Comm § 609, at 682 (footnote omitted).
62 A. DENNING, THE CHANGING LAW 105 (1953).
63 Columbia Natl Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 35 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1929); Rosenblum v.
Manufacturers Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 79, 200 N.E. 587 (1936).
64 Seidman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 162 Misc. 560, 296 N.Y.S. 55 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
65 Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946); Marks v. Gates, 154 F.
481 (9th Cir. 1907); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2416 (3d ed. 1940).
66 Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
67 See cases cited note 53 supra.
68 Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1229 (1958).
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The exceptions are sufficiently numerous to indicate judicial dissatis-
faction with the traditional requirement that the mistake must relate
to basic assumptions and, if not mutual, must have been apparent to
the party desiring enforcement of the contract. The confused state
of the authorities in the United States may indicate that we are at
the threshold of a moral advance in this area of contract law such as
occurs from time to time after a preliminary period of indecision and
marshalling of judicial determination. The adoption of the negative
interest theory of damages, already applied in Anglo-American equity
and at law in a few states, would carry us a long way toward the moral
approach.09 A firmly established doctrine is not eliminated, however,
by scattered decisions. If other jurisdictions wait until the weight of
authority changes, it will never change.
The chief purposes of the requirement that the mistake be known
to the party desiring to enforce the contract are to guard against false
claims of mistake and to eliminate the factor of the knowing party's
change of position in reliance on the contract. If the mistake is clearly
proved and due weight is given to the other party's change of position,
as Corbin suggests, 70 the requirement of recognizability of the mistake,
which can easily be resolved so as to correspond with the court's pre-
dilection for granting or denying relief, could be dispensed with with-
out serious threat to contractual stability.
A relaxation of the strict rules of law has been urged by many
authorities. McClintock has said, "[W]here the two forms of remedies
are now administered by the same courts, in the same form of action,
the distinction should be abardoned and rescission allowed in any
case where specific performance would be denied because of the mis-
take,"7 1 Patterson has questioned the law-equity distinction and says
that courts have frequently found pretexts for refusing to apply it,
69 Jhering's theory of damages for the negative interest was first stated in an article
publisthed in 1S60. Jiering, Culpq in Contrahendo, oder Shadensersqtx 'ei nichtigen odfr
nicht zur Perfektion gelangten Vertrageui, in 4 R. JIERING, JAHRIUCHI. FUR  E DOGMATIK
1 (1860). His theory is explained in English in Smith, Four German Jurists, 12 POL. SCa. Q.
21, 43-48 (1897): There can be no claim for damages for nonperformance because this
would recognize the contract as valid. The only claim is to be put in as good a position
as if the other party had never been led to suppose that he had a contract-the "negative
interest." The doctrine of culpa in contrahendo follows from the duty to use care in con-
tracting; Jhering based liability for negative damages on negligence in contracting.
Section 122 of the German Civil Code gives full recognition to this theory. ZPO § 122
(C. H. Beck 1966). This measure of damage is applied in our law in cases of restitution.
E.g., Abner M. Harper, Inc. v. City of Newburgh, 159 App. Div. 695, 145 N.Y.S. 59 (2d
Dep't 1913); 3 CoRIN § 606.
70 3 CoRBIN § 609, at 689.
71 McClintock, supra note 6, at 477 (footnote omitted).
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He adds that the doctrine is "insupportable" in mistakes that result in
economic consequences. 72 Pound has remarked, "In states where the
value of the bargain may be recovered, it may well be sometimes that
the bargain might as well be enforced in equity, if it is not to be can-
celled."78 Corbin has pointed out:
Courts refusing to decree rescission for unilateral mistake often
say that to do otherwise would tend greatly to destroy stability and
certainty in the making of contracts. In some degree, this may be
true; but certainty in the law is largely an illusion at best, and
altogether too high a price may be paid in the effort to attain it,
*,, A sufficient degree of stability and certainty will be maintained
if the court carefully weighs the combination of factors in each
case, is convinced that the substantial mistake asserted was in fact
made, and gives due weight to material changes in position.74
If we have discarded the dual standard of legal morality which
grew from accidents of remote history, we are doing the law a disservice
in pretending that the dual standard still exists, and we are encouraging
practices on a lower moral level in the multitude of transactions that
never reach the courts. It is difficult to ignore the fact that most coun-
tries of the western world allow relief for mistake in contracting in
a manner similar to that which we apply in our own legal system in
suits for specific performance. 75 Whatever choice we make, it should
72 Patterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake, 28 COLum. L. RFv. 859 (1928).
73 R. POUND, INTRODUCTrON TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 132 (1922).
74 3 Comn § 609, at 688-89.
75 In English law the only mistake of legal significance at common law is mistake
which obliterates the subject matter in the sense the parties understood it; such mistake
that the identity of the subject matter is different from the subject matter in the terms
agreed upon. The effect of such mistake is that there is no contract at all, a phenomenon
which Lawson interprets as eliminating the doctrine of error in substantia from English
law. Lawson, Error in Substantia, 52 L.Q. Ry. 79 (1986). The defendant prevails not
because his mistake constitutes a defense to an otherwise enforceable contract, even though
the mistake was substantial and mutual, but because there was no valid contract, by
reason of the absence of any subject matter as the parties understood it to be. Other
mistake, even if substantial, has no effect in English common law; that is to say, in actions
for damages. It must be a case either of res extincta or res sua, to make the contract void.
G. CumsHIR & C. F FooT, LAw OF CONTRACr 192 (6th ed. 1964). Relief for common or
mutual mistake, even if the mistake was not fundamental in the foregoing sense, will be
granted in equity, if the court sees fit, by ordering specific performance of the contract as
rectified, id. at 200, or by setting the contract aside, or by the denial of specific perform-
ance. Stewart v. Kennedy, 15 App. Cas. 75 (H.L. 1890); Huddersfield Banking Co. v. Henry
Lister & Son, [18 95] 2 Ch. 273 (common mistake); Townshend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. Jr.
828, 31 Eng. Rep. 1076 (Ch. 1801); Bray v. Briggs, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) 817 (Rolls Ct. 1872);
Webster v. Cecil, 30 Beav. 62, 54 Eng. Rep. 812 (Rolls Ct. 1861); Malins v. Freeman, 2
Keen 25, 48 Eng. Rep. 537 (Rolls Ct. 1837); G. C maH & C. FimooT, supra at 198.
It would seem that the provision in the Law of Property Act of 1925, 15 Geo.
5, c. 20, § 49, sched. 2, authorizing the court in its discretion to return the deposit
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be based on our conclusion as to whether stability of transactions is
more important than recognition of the obligation to share the bur-
dens of misfortune when a contract has been made by mistake, and
the other party can be restored to the position he was in before
the contract was made. The choice should not rest on a technical
distinction between law and equity.
when specific performance has been denied, constitutes a legislative adoption of the
equity approach to relief for mistake, according to which the court may rescind the
contract if it sees fit to do so, and expressly authorizes such action.
In the dvil law, which has never been troubled by a division of jurisdiction between
courts of law and courts of equity, the problem of adjusting the hardship caused by mis-
take is solved by excusing the mistaken party from performing, while protecting the other
party against actual loss, although not against the loss of his expected profit.
